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barrier to the assertion of his rights and the fact that the government would not be prejudiced because it
had received notice within the two-year statutory period was not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.
Kelly Latham
Class of 2006

THE SECOND CIRCUIT RE-CONCEPTUALIZES THE "MERELY INCIDENTAL"
EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE THAT MIXED CONTRACTS ARE NOT
MARITIME IN NATURE.
Admiralty jurisdiction existed over an insurance coverage dispute where the policy provided both
Comprehensive General Liability and Ship-repairers Legal Liability coverage and the nature of
that coverage was primarily marine.

Folksamerica Reinsurance Company v. Clean Water of New York, Inc.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
413 F.3d 307
(Decided on June 30, 2005)
Milton Rivera ("Rivera") was injured while cleaning the oil tanks of an ocean-going barge that
was docked in New York Harbor when he was overcome by fumes and fell off a ladder into the oil tank.
The insured, Clean Water of New York, Inc. ("Clean Water"), was in the business of ship repair and
maintenance. It had subcontracted some of its business to Rivera's employer. Shortly thereafter Rivera
brought a negligence suit against Clean Water in state court.
Clean Water was insured by Christiania General Insurance Corp. of New York ("Christiania").
The plaintiff herein, Folksamerica Reinsurance Company ("Folksamerica"), was the successor in
interest to the insurer Christiania.
The insured sought defense and indemnification of Rivera's suit via its insurance policy. The
policy's coverage was defined by a Comprehensive General Liability ("CG L") section and a Ship
repairers Legal Liability ("S L L") section.
Folksamerica filed a declaratory judgment suit against Clean Water in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiff averred that admiralty jurisdiction existed and
sought voidance of the policy, rescission, and a declaration that it was obligated to neither defend nor
indemnify Clean Water. The defendant raised various defenses but the one at issue herein was its
challenge to the court's admiralty jurisdiction.
The district court agreed with the defendant that the CGL section of the policy was a standard
"all-risk policy" and that any maritime risks that it covered were merely incidental to the covered non
maritime risks. The court declined jurisdiction because it believed that a CGL policy could not be
characterized as one of the three traditional forms of marine insurance-hull insurance, cargo insurance,
and indemnity insurance.
The issue before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was simply whether this insurance
policy was a maritime contract so as to sustain admiralty jurisdiction. The analysis began with a
threshold inquiry, as required by Second Circuit precedent, of whether the subject-matter of the dispute
involved maritime commerce. Curiously, the district court did not address this question and the Court of
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Appeals easily found that the present case passed this threshold: Rivera sustained his injury while
cleaning the tanks of oil transporting barges.
Generally, a contract will only be considered maritime if its subject-matter is purely maritime; in
other words, a mixed contract falls outside of admiralty's purview. However, one exception to this rule,
stressed by the plaintiff herein, is that jurisdiction will be found where non-maritime elements of the
contract are "merely incidental." Regarding this exception, the Second Circuit in this case re
conceptualized it by referring to a recent Supreme Court decision.
In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby Pty Ltd., the Supreme Court found that the
important inquiry in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over a contract was not whether the non
marine components were merely incidental to the contract as a whole, but rather, whether the shipping
contract's principle objective was to accomplish the transport of goods by sea. 125 S.Ct. 385, 393-394
( 2004).
The Court of Appeals herein viewed Norfolk Southern Railway Co. as contrary to the "merely
incidental" exception because the Supreme Court exercised admiralty jurisdiction over a contract with
non-marine components that were more than incidental. Accordingly, the Second Circuit turned the
"merely incidental" exception into the "principle objective" exception: admiralty jurisdiction will exist
over a mixed insurance contract where the principle objective of the contract is to insure against
maritime risks.
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision and found the insurance policy to be
marine based on its CGL and S L L sections. Regarding the former, the defendant, Clean Water made
two arguments. First, the CGL policy's form dictated that it was a shore-side policy. The Court
rebutted this by pointing-out that the form of the policy is not dispositive; what matters is whether the
insurer assumes risks that are marine in nature. Indeed, other federal courts have also treated CG L
policies as marine, but those findings were based on the policy's specific coverage and not its form.
Second, Clean Water argued that the coverage provided by the CG L section was for shore-side
risks such as personal injury and property damage to third parties: the CGL section herein excluded all
the risks covered by hull and protection and indemnity ("P & I") insurance.
The Court responded to this by illustrating how the CG L section of the policy had been tailored
to specifically cover marine risks. Normally, CGL policies exclude liabilities resulting from the
ownership of watercraft. The policy here had an endorsement that specifically provided watercraft
liability coverage. Additionally, there was an endorsement covering any loss involving an in rem suit.
Further, an endorsement was added covering pollution, which is widely recognized as marine in nature.
Next, the Court viewed the coverage set out in the CGL's completed operations coverage and
products hazard coverage as primarily maritime because their principle purpose was to insure against
marine risks. Initially, it was noted that the Fifth Circuit has also treated a CGL policy as one of marine
insurance. Next, since the defendant, Clean Water, was in the business of ship repair and maintenance,
it necessarily follows that the risk of injury after negligent maintenance or repair was maritime in nature
and as such could affect maritime commerce. Finally, with a ship repair and maintenance business, the
losses covered by the completed operations and products hazards sections overlap with the risks
normally covered by P & I insurance, such as the injury or death of a seaman or passenger, collision
with other ships, allision with a stationary object, and towage liability.
The SLL section of the policy was also viewed as marine. The S L L section provided coverage
for vessels lost or damaged while undergoing repairs by the insureds. It was viewed as marine based on
the fact that numerous courts have exercised admiralty jurisdiction over S L L policies and not one has
declined to do so.
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Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court and found the insurance contract at
issue to be marine because its principle purpose was to insure against losses associated with m aritime
risks. Accordingly, the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction herein was proper.
Jeremy Barberi
Class of 2006

PLAIN MEANING OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN INSURER AND
SHIPOWNER GUIDES COURT'S RESOLUTION OF A DISPUTE OVER RECOVERY
FROM A THIRD PARTY
The Court of Appeals held that a shipowner breached a settlement agreement with its insurer by
not seeking the latter's consent to a suit settlement with a third party and by not giving the insurer
a share of the settlement. Under Puerto Rican law, if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt to the intentions of the contracting parties, then the court will look to the plain meaning of
the agreement.

The Home Insurance Company v. Pan American Grain Manufacturing Co. , Inc.
United States Court of Appeals for the I st Circuit
397 F.3d 12
(Decided February 4, 2005)
Plaintiff-Appellant Home Insurance Company ("Home") appealed from a decision of the district
court awarding summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Pan American Grain Manufacturing Co., Inc.
("Pan American"). Home, Pan American's insurer, alleged that Pan American had breached a settlement
agreement by not seeking its approval of a settlement Pan American reached with Ochoa Fertilizer, Inc.
("Ochea"), and by failing to award Home one-third of the amount of that settlement.
Home had issued a marine hull insurance policy ("the policy") to Pan American that provided
coverage up to $6,500,000 in the event that Pan American's ship ITB Zorra ("Zorra") was lost. The
Zorra caught fire April 24, 1995, resulting in her destruction. Pan American filed a claim which Home
denied; the insurer aJJeged that the loss was a result of the Zorra's unseaworthiness and thus amounted
to a policy exception. Home brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment of non-coverage and Pan
American counterclaimed. The two parties entered into a settlement agreement under which Home paid
$3,333,000 to Pan American and Pan American promised: I ) to seek written approval from Home for
any future recovery from third parties stemming from this claim, and 2) that Home would receive one
third of any recovery from third parties. The settlement agreement contained a provision stating that
Home was not entitled to share in any"verdict or award . . . for punitive damages and/or loss of use."
One year after the parties entered into the settlement agreement, Pan American settled a suit with
Ochoa for $800,000. Pan American did not give Home prior notice of the settlement or one-third of the
award. Home responded by filing suit, seeking one-third of the $800,000, plus interest and attorney's
fees. Pan American claimed that the Ochoa settlement was for damages for "loss of use" of the Zorra
and therefore excluded from the settlement agreement. Home made two arguments: l) that under
maritime law, a shipowner was barred from recovering for lose of use where the insured vessel was a
total loss, and 2) the Ochoa settlement did not result from a "verdict or award."
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